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Many attempts at understanding auditory verbal hallucinations have tried to explain
why there is an auditory experience in the absence of an appropriate stimulus. We
suggest that many instance of voice-hearing should be approached differently. More
specifically, they could be viewed primarily as hallucinated acts of communication, rather
than hallucinated sounds. We suggest that this change of perspective is reflected in,
and helps to explain, the successes of two recent therapeutic techniques. These two
techniques are: Relating Therapy for Voices and Avatar Therapy.
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Introduction
In this paper, we examine the phenomenon of auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) from the
perspective of pragmatic theory, the branch of linguistics that studies communication1. Many
attempts at understanding AVHs have tried to explain why there is an auditory experience in the
absence of an appropriate stimulus. In other words, they try to explain why certain people have
an auditory experience in the absence of the usual conditions for having an auditory experience.
Along with many clinicians, we think that voice-hearing should be understood diﬀerently. More
speciﬁcally, we suggest it could be viewed, in many of the most troubling cases, primarily
as a hallucinated act of communication, rather than a hallucinated sound. This is in keeping
with the idea that human beings are not just perceptual creatures: they are deeply social and
communicative. We suggest that this theoretical change of perspective has been foreshadowed by
various therapeutic approaches. Furthermore, we suggest that this may provide theoretical insights
into the apparent successes of recent therapeutic techniques. We examine two such techniques:
Relating Therapy for Voices (Hayward et al., 2009) and Avatar Therapy (Leﬀ et al., 2014).
We proceed as follows. We start by explaining the shift in focus that we endorse, namely,
from audition to communication. Then we show how pragmatic theory, which examines how
human beings extract meanings from utterances, might be applied to AVHs, conceived in the
way we propose. Finally, we present the two therapeutic techniques mentioned above and give
an explanation of why they might be eﬀective from the perspective of pragmatic theory.
From Audition to Communication
Standard theoretical attempts to explain AVHs tend to try to explain why there is an auditory
experience in the absence of an appropriate stimulus. This clearly builds on a particular
1For the record: FD is a linguist and SW is a philosopher.
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characterization of the phenomenon to be explained. Thus, for
example, Garrett and Silva (2003, p. 445) state that “the subjective
quality of sensation is a near-universal feature of auditory
hallucinations.” Wu (2012, p. 90) states that, “in every instance
of AVH, the relevant internal state is a type of auditory state.”
Even the well-known PSYRATS scale, which in many respects is
in keeping with our approach, describes AVHs as:
An auditory perception that has the compelling sense of reality of
a true perception but occurs without external stimulation of the
relevant sensory organ.
(Haddock et al., 1999)
Our suggestion is that, for many of the most distressing AVHs,
we should not focus on sounds and on auditory experiences, but
rather on communication. In other words, these hallucinations
are most fruitfully viewed as communication hallucinations that
happen to be auditory, rather than auditory hallucinations that
happen to be communicative.
We think that this position is motivated by the fact that
an auditory-based approach mischaracterised several instances
of the phenomenon. Firstly, some voice-hearers describe an
experience of “soundless voices” (reports of which go at least as
far back as Bleuler, 1950). For example, one participant in a recent
study reports:
It’s hard to describe how I could ‘hear’ a voice that was not
auditory; but the words used and the emotions they contained
were completely clear, distinct and unmistakeable, maybe even
more so than if I had heard them aurally.
(Woods et al., 2015, p. 326)
Secondly, “voices” are also “heard” by congenitally deaf people
with psychosis. Jo Atkinson (2006) has done very important work
correcting the “audio-centrism” of mainstream perspectives.
She has shown that deaf voice-hearers experience vague visual
imagery like being addressed in sign-language, or of disembodied
lips. But they do not have auditory experiences at all.
Of course, somebody might object that in congenitally deaf
“voice-hearers,” the visual imagery is the basis of the “voice”
hallucination, in a way that is analogous to how, on an audition-
centered view, the auditory experience forms the basis of voice-
hearing experiences in voice-hearers who aren’t deaf. This
strikes us as implausible, in part because it fails to account for
reported cases, which we have just mentioned, among the hearing
population, of soundless voices, or experiences of “receiving a
communication without any sensory component” (Frith, 1992,
p. 73). Furthermore, it fails to make obvious use of what “voice-
hearing” experiences in deaf and hearing populations have in
common. We suggest that what they have in common is that they
involve the experience of being communicated with. Once you
do this, you can account for the diﬀerences relatively easily, since
the communication is bound to be experienced in the way that
communication tends to be experienced by that individual (viz.,
signing for the deaf). This also accounts for why there is a much
higher prevalence of hallucinations reported in the auditory
modality (within the hearing population) among subjects with
psychosis, namely, because they tend to communicate auditorily,
with speech (clearly there are hallucinations and sensory
disturbances in other modalities, too, be we are explaining the
relative prevalence of auditory hallucinations).
Another phenomenon, found in 64% of inpatients suﬀering
from a psychotic disorder (Minas et al., 1992) which may
also beneﬁt from something like our approach, is delusions of
reference. As Startup and Startup (2005) note, there seem to
be at least two varieties of delusions of reference2. One variety
concerns the mistaken sense that others are communicating by
subtle non-verbal means (e.g., gestures, stances, arrangements
of objects), while the other variety concerns the false belief that
others are stealthily spying. It is the former kind that may both
beneﬁt from, and support, a communication-centered approach.
The factors that may then account for the diﬀerences between
communicative AVHs and communicative delusions of reference
would be an interesting direction for research, but goes beyond
the scope of this brief paper.
It is important, at this point, that we be clear as to which
subset of the heterogeneous group of phenomena that get
called AVHs we think are the most suitable to being viewed
as communication hallucinations (that sometimes happen to be
auditory). First of all, there are auditory hallucinations that aren’t
strictly AVHs, because they are not verbal (e.g., groans, clicks,
bangs, music). However, among the clearly verbal cases, there
is the issue of whether the subject is perceived as the speciﬁc
addressee of the speech act. Cases where this is most clear
are when the voice is either commanding, critical or abusive
(these features are reported in Nayani and David, 1996 with
a prevalence of 84, 77, and 70%, respectively). Cases where
this is less clear, are cases where the voice is giving a neutral,
running commentary (e.g., “John is raising his right arm and
standing up to pick up the paper” etc.). Although these cases
can be recognized as self-generated, they can be distressing
because they are loud and interfere with the voice hearer’s
life3. These kinds of voices are not the kinds of voices that
we think are best captured by our approach and it is worth
noting that the kind of distress caused indirectly through the
voice interfering with the subject’s life is rather diﬀerent from
the kind of distress directly caused by the voice-hearer being
abused, criticized and commanded by a malevolent agent. The
prevalence of running commentary hallucinations is relatively
high, but not as high as, for example, command hallucinations
(55% vs. 67% inMcCarthy-Jones et al., 2012). It is the latter, along
with abusive and critical hallucinations, that are best captured by
our communication-centered approach.
Pragmatic Theory and the Extraction of
Meaning from Speech
The usual conditions of someone speaking, and one’s
understanding them, do not only involve the sounds that they
2We would like to thank one of the referees for pointing us in the direction of these
communicative delusions of reference.
3We would like to thank one of the referees for pointing this out.
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make, but also a grasp of what they intend to communicate. The
study of communication is the territory of “pragmatic theory,” the
branch of linguistics that studies “utterances” (namely, linguistic
communicative acts) rather than free-ﬂoating, de-contextualized,
“sentences.”
It is important to recognize that a voice-hearing experience is
the experience of a spoken utterance, not a free-ﬂoating sentence.
On hearing an utterance, a hearer will automatically interpret
the meaning of that utterance. It is this interpretation process,
which we think is important for explaining why there so often
is a speaker (e.g., a person, a demon, or a god) behind the
voice. In order to interpret the meaning of an utterance, a hearer
must attribute the intentions behind its use at that moment, and
intentions are never free-ﬂoating: they are always the intentions
of an agent, of something with a mind (Wilson and Sperber,
2004).
A voice-hearer might hear the utterance “He is a loser.”
Without knowing whom the speaker intends to refer to with
the pronoun ‘he,’ the hearer can’t know what is meant by that
utterance. And yet it seems that voice-hearers generally know
who is being referred to in their voices, and what the voices
mean. As Waters and Jardri (2015, p. 534) put it: “The clarity
of hallucinated speech is indeed often low or fuzzy although the
message is always clear to the patient.”. This suggests that the
voice-hearer takes there to be a speaker behind the voice, with
an intention to communicate, and they interpret what it is that
speaker is saying; who they are referring to, and why.
Likewise, a voice-hearer might hear a voice say “Nice one!”
The meaning of this will depend entirely on the intention
perceived. It could either be something positive, an expression of
congratulation. Alternatively, it could be sneering and sarcastic.
Somebody might object that this is something that the voice-
hearer will tell from the way that the utterance is said, and
ultimately from what it sounds like. But we suggest that ‘the way
it is said’ or ‘what it sounds like’ is determined by the emotion
of the speaker, e.g., elation, in the positive case, or, e.g., shame,
in the negative case. This means that the fact that it is a person (a
communicator) behind the voice, and that they are nasty, explains
why the utterance sounds the way it does, and thus, why it is
interpreted the way it is, rather than the other way around.
Within this approach, where voice-hearing experiences are
primarily viewed as communicative rather than auditory, it
becomes less surprising that the voice is taken to come from
a speaker (communicative agent), since this is a necessary
dimension of all communication. Going beyond suggestions
from Bell (2013) and Wilkinson and Bell (forthcoming), it is
relevant to say not only that representation of agency in general,
and speciﬁc agents in particular, is a key aspect of many AVHs:
but also that the representation of agents as communicative, and
as aﬀording communicative interactions is also crucial.
A Perspective on Therapeutic
Interventions
Although clear and detailed theoretical formulations of this
approach have been lacking, it is implicit (and at times explicit) in
a number of recent therapeutic frameworks and techniques (see
Thomas et al., 2014 for a review).Here we examine two promising
such techniques: Relating Therapy and Avatar Therapy.
Relating Therapy
What is It?
Relating Therapy was developed byHayward et al. (2009) with the
aim of improving the relationship between voice hearers and their
voices by encouraging them to interact closely with their voices
and to relate to them in a more assertive manner.
A Relating Therapeutic intervention consists of multiple
sessions, whichmake up three separate phases. The aim of phase 1
is to introduce the voice hearer to the notion of Relating Therapy,
and to consider the implications of relating to and interacting
with their voices. The objective of phase 2 is then to explore
the themes within the voice hearer’s history with regard to how
they have related socially with other people as well as with their
voices. Having completed phase 1 and 2, the voice hearer is then
ready to enter into phase 3 by exploring and developing assertive
approaches to relating to and socially interacting with their voices
and other people. Together with the therapist, the voice hearer
participates in role-plays to explore the intentions and motives
of their voices and other people, and to practice a more assertive
approach to social interaction.
Why Does It Work?
Relating Therapy was developed based on the intuition that, just
as our perceptions of, reactions to and relationships with our
colleagues, our family members and our friends are eﬀected by
how we relate to those individuals, a voice hearer’s perception
of, reaction to and ultimately their relationship with their voices
might be aﬀected by how they relate to those voices. For example,
a voice hearer might assume a passive and submissive role in
relation to their voice, thus allowing the voice to assume a
dominant, bullying role. Hayward et al. (2009) conceived of the
therapy as a tool for normalizing the voice-hearing experience
by locating it in the realm of typical social interactions. They
recognize the disparity between hearers’ reported emotional
responses to their voices (Garrett and Silva, 2003) and their
passive relationship with them, and they intend the therapy to be
a route out of this relationship and into one of a more reciprocal
nature. Indeed, ﬁndings from an early feasibility study suggest
that Relating Therapy reduces the distress caused by voices and
triggers a change in how the hearers relates to their voices
(Hayward et al., 2009).
Relating Therapy in its conception embraces the agentive
aspect of the voice-hearing experience, and encourages voice
hearers to view their voices as coming from intentional
agents whose behavior is dependent on how the voice hearer
relates to them. Indeed, when AVHs are viewed as intentional
communicative acts, the speaker behind those communicative
acts is more speciﬁcally a communicative agent who seeks to
inﬂuence and bring about emotions and behaviors in the hearer
via the production of (often) distressing utterances. As such,
the voice hearer has the capacity to become an interlocutor in
the experience and talk back to the speaker behind their voice,
potentially bringing about change in the content of their verbal
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hallucinations, and ultimately empowering the voice hearer
by exposing them to the malleability of their voice-hearing
experiences and their emotional responses to them. After all, a
communicative exchange is an iterative process in which what
one interlocutor says builds on what has already been said and
inﬂuences what will then be said by the other interlocutor.
Avatar Therapy
What is It?
Avatar Therapy consists in encouraging the voice hearers to
construct a visual “avatar,” using a computer program. The voice
hearer subsequently interacts with the avatar. In a pilot study,
after up to seven 30 min sessions of Avatar Therapy, almost all
of the patients reported an improvement in both the frequency
and the severity of their voices. Three of the 16 patients stopped
hearing voices completely after up to 16 years of experiencing
AVHs.
Why Does It Work?
The intention behind the development of Avatar Therapy was to
develop a tool to facilitate a dialog between voice hearers and
their voices. Leﬀ et al. (2014) propose that an avatar provides
something for the voice hearer to stand up to, and, ultimately,
something that they can control. As is pointed out in Leﬀ et al.
(2014), many clinicians are skeptical of this therapeutic approach,
because it is seen as an extreme case of colluding with the patient’s
pathology, providing a ‘real’ physical manifestation of that which
is hallucinated. Like Leﬀ et al. (2014), we suggest that this line of
thought is misguided. Leﬀ et al. (2014), defend their approach by
emphasizing that:
Since the externalized voice is part of the patient’s inner world,
discounting it or refusing to acknowledge the patient’s experience
of this split-oﬀ part as real negates the possibility of the patient
reintegrating it into their psychic structure.
(Leﬀ et al., 2014, p. 6)
We want to unpack this point a little further by emphasizing
that when AVHs are viewed primarily as hallucinations of
intentional communicative acts, the communicator behind the
voice can be as much part of the experience as the sound of the
voice, or as what the voice is saying. In fact, we suggest that the
latter two aspects of the experience are likely to be dependent on
the voice hearer’s perception of the speaker behind their voice. It
is implicit in the thinking behind Avatar Therapy that the speaker
behind the voice is critical to the voice hearer’s perception of and
reaction to their voice, but Leﬀ et al. (2014, p. 1) see “the entity”
behind the voice as “invisible” in AVH. We suggest that quite
the opposite to providing a physical manifestation of that which
was ‘invisible’ before, Avatar Therapy aﬀords the voice hearer
the opportunity to have some control over the characteristics
of the speaker behind their voice in a controlled and deliberate
manner, where, before, the speaker behind the voice, though an
ever present aspect of the AVH experience, had free reign to
present in any way4.
The positive outcomes of Avatar Therapy are not surprising if
voice-hearing experiences are seen as primarily communication
hallucinations. The distressing aspect of voice-hearing is often
the intention behind the voice, i.e., to threaten, harass, or abuse.
Indeed, pragmatic theory teaches us that the mere words heard
without the underlying (perceived) intentions are not simply
weaker threats (or harassments, or abuses): they fail to be threats
at all. It makes sense that if the voice-hearer is able to create a
benevolent avatar for their voices, then the attitude and content
conveyed by the voices will invariably be less malicious and less
distressing.
Conclusion
In keeping with recent therapies that seem eﬀective, an important
subset of AVHs should be viewed as hallucinations of intentional
acts of communication, rather than primarily as hallucinated
sounds. This manages to capture what we take to be important
in many AVHs that are reported as auditory, as well as those
experiences reported as soundless voices, and “voice-hearing”
experiences in the congenitally deaf. Theorists who want to
explain voice-hearing in terms of, e.g., spontaneous activation
in auditory cortex (Cho and Wu, 2013), would either deny the
existence of these phenomena, or say that they are not “real
instances” of AVH. This latter option, we think, is revisionist and
undesireable. We would rather encourage the grouping together
of communication AVHs, some of which may be auditory, while
others might not be, rather than a grouping along the axis
of auditory phenomenology. Of course, this then makes the
term “AVH” a bit of a misnomer. But superﬁcial terminological
considerations should not be what drives us when we group
together clinically relevant phenomena. We could easily call them
“verbal hallucinations” or “voice hallucinations,” or even stick to
the pre-theoretical term “voice-hearing experiences.”
From our communication-centered perspective, the
interpretations hearers derive from these experiences, and the
distress they cause, can be better understood. Moreover, such an
approach may allow pragmatic theory to provide insights into
how a voice-hearer might be able to manipulate the content and
delivery of their voices by engineering the identity and nature of
the speaker behind the voice.
4 Indeed a voice hearer recently told us: “My voices are always here, looking at you,
even when they are silent.”
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